Authors: Jevtić, Filip 
Vujošević, Slobodan
Affiliations: Mathematics
Mathematical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
Title: Logic of the ontological argument
Journal: Belgrade Philosophical Annual
Issue: 35
First page: 111
Last page: 114
Issue Date: 2022
Rank: M24
ISSN: 0353-3891
DOI: 10.5937/BPA2235111J
In his ontological argument Gödel says nothing about its underlying logic. The argument is modal and at least of second-order and since S5 axiom is used so it is widely accepted that the logic of the argument is the S5 second-order modal logic. However, there is a step in the proof in which Gödel applies the necessitation rule on the assumptions of the argument (see [3]). This is repeated by all of his followers (see [1] and [5]). This application of the necessitation rule can seriously harm the consequence relation of the logic of the ontological argument. It seems that the only way to preserve the modal logic S5 for the ontological argument is to assume some of its axioms in the necessitated form.
Keywords: Godel | ontological argument | modal logic | necessitatio
Publisher: Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju

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